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Th is book of readings attempts to measure the quality of representation and democracy at the local level in 
Canada through an examination of the concepts of accountability and responsiveness. Th e three sections into 
which the book is organized discuss political parties at the local level, the types of local politician, and the impact 
of multiple delivery mechanisms. As will be evident from the summary which follows, the variety of authors 
involved in a book of readings leads to varied and at times confl icting views on subjects. Th is is not necessarily 
a bad thing if it prompts the reader to pause and consider the merits of the diff ering points of view, but it does 
mean that one needs to withhold fi nal judgment on any particular issue until all of the material is read.
Political Parties
Chapter 1 starts with the premise that a non-partisan system (most commonly identifi ed as one without 
organized political parties on council) is expected to lead to more responsiveness and accountability. Th e former 
is easily understandable since individual councillors are free to respond to the views and concerns of their local 
electorate whereas councillors who belong to a local political party are constrained by a requirement to support 
whatever position their party might take on local issues. 
However, the suggestion that non-partisan systems also lead to more accountability is surprising and 
puzzling. On municipal councils consisting of individual councillors not organized within political parties there 
is no governing group nor is there any opposition group subjecting proposals to scrutiny and off ering alternatives. 
On such a council everyone is responsible for everything, which also means that no one is really responsible 
for anything. Pressed by local citizens about some issue, councillors can easily defl ect blame by claiming that 
they were all for it but couldn’t get “the others” to agree. Unless there is a recorded vote, municipal records only 
indicate whether a motion carried or not; there is no indication of how members voted. 
I suppose that an extremely dedicated local citizen could attend every council meeting (or watch every 
meeting on television if available) and attempt to record whose hands went up (or didn’t) when votes were called, 
but such hardy souls would be few and far between (and desperately in need of other hobbies and interests). 
Very controversial issues that get signifi cant media coverage may identify some councillors who were actively 
promoting or opposing the matter at hand, but that is also a hit and miss proposition. 
Chapter 3 off ers a diff erent perspective on this issue by reporting that one can expect greater accountability 
and responsiveness when a political party holds a majority of seats on council. But it makes the important 
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distinction that such parties should be local in nature. It is critical of situations in which national parties run 
candidates in municipal elections, arguing that the nationalization of local elections has a negative eff ect on 
accountability.
However, the preceding chapter (p. 49) off ers the contrary view that “for the partisan model to work at 
the local level, elections taking place there should be in line with those of the other levels of government.” If 
national parties present candidates for municipal election, we are told, the result is parties or coalitions whose 
positions on the political spectrum are well known to the voters. I would argue that if a partisan council is to be 
accountable locally, it should not have any connection to the political parties found at other levels of government. 
I will never forget arriving in Britain in 1967 to begin my doctoral studies just after Labour Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson had reluctantly devaluated the British pound. In the subsequent municipal elections, Labour 
Party members on local councils experienced widespread defeat—not because of how they had handled local 
issues but because the British people were angry about the increased cost of living arising from the devalued 
currency. Political parties bring accountability to municipal government if they are purely local parties focused 
on local issues. 
Local Politicians
Chapter 4 analyzes the political careers of all local elected representatives in Edmonton and Calgary between 
1885 and 2015. It found that turnover on municipal councils decreased and that the re-election rate of 
incumbents increased (which would seem to be inevitable given the fi rst fi nding). It also noted that many 
municipal councillors went on to pursue political careers at the provincial level and (to a much more limited 
extent) at the federal level. Another not unexpected fi nding was that the threat of electoral defeat means more 
to the “municipal professional” politician and the “provincial climber” than it did to municipal politicians who 
had little interest in prolonging their local careers.
Chapter 5 describes what happened to incumbent councillors in Greater Sudbury and London, Ontario 
in the municipal elections of 2014 after they were strongly criticized in reports from the Ontario Ombudsman 
for having attended closed, informal council meetings or committee meetings that were illegal. Many did 
not run again and those who did fared poorly. While these examples demonstrate how negative publicity can 
dramatically reduce the normal staying power of incumbent councillors, it is also important to note the other 
observations made by Andrew Sancton, the author of this chapter. As he points out, the Ontario Ombudsman 
of that time (André Marin) appeared to hold strongly negative views of municipalities as a level of government 
and the meetings that he attacked as illegal did not appear to fall into that category under provincial legislation. 
Th e retirement or defeat of councillors whose conduct was criticized by a provincial oversight offi  cer might 
seem to suggest local accountability at work. But Sancton concludes that those concerned about accountable 
municipal government should perhaps reconsider an arrangement whereby high profi le but unaccountable 
provincial offi  cials pass judgment on those elected to local councils.
Chapter 6 off ers further perspectives on accountability by addressing two key questions: accountability to 
whom and of whom. When asked about the most important part of exercising their mandate, amateur councillors 
emphasized service to their electors, notably taking their issues to the municipal offi  ce and supporting resolution 
of local concerns. In contrast, professional councillors are focused more on their capacity to deliver solutions to 
problems found in the municipality. Th ey are policy makers whereas the amateur councillors emphasize their 
individual responsiveness. 
Multi-level Governing
Chapter 7 notes the fragmentation of local service production and delivery, with a variety of actors involved 
in responding to the needs of the residents, and the blurring of accountability that results. Using the example 
of London, Ontario, it fi nds that a number of the special purpose bodies operating there are not especially 
open to the public, providing no information about their meetings (when held and where) and not posting 
agendas or minutes on their websites. Even so, the chapter concludes that most special purpose bodies in this 
city provide a public account of their activities and are subject to scrutiny and sanction by local politicians and 
citizens. In contrast, it found that inter-municipal agreements dealing with service delivery were much more 
defi cient in terms of accountability and transparency. Despite being public documents, none of the agreements 
were publicly available. 
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Th e accountability challenge of special purpose bodies is explored further in Chapter 8 which discusses the 
operation of Metrolinx, the regional transportation agency charged with leading the coordination, fi nancing, 
and development of an integrated transportation network for the Greater Golden Horseshoe area. While a 
majority of the board members of Metrolinx were originally municipal councillors or staff , in 2009 they were 
excluded from the board and replaced by non-elected provincial appointees. 
Th e chapter off ers confl icting views on the merits of this change. We are told that because planning for 
smart growth calls for concentrating investment in certain areas and favouring certain modes of transportation, 
a governing board that responds to local pressures might not lead to the most appropriate policy and investment 
decisions for a region. On the other hand, the chapter notes that a Metrolinx board of unelected provincial 
appointees makes the agency vulnerable to political interference and that the previous local representation on 
the board made it more diffi  cult for provincial politicians to keep changing their mind about what was politically 
better than what was better from a transportation perspective. Ultimately, the chapter concludes that the change 
in the composition of the Metrolinx board means that it is no longer accountable to, or representative of, local 
communities, and makes investment choices that are questionable in terms of effi  ciency. 
Chapter 9 explores the challenge of addressing issues involving multiple levels of government by comparing 
and contrasting the governance models involved in addressing homelessness in Calgary and in Montreal. In the 
former, eff orts to combat homelessness are highly coordinated at the local level but limited fi nancial support 
from the provincial level has hampered their eff ectiveness. While the provincial government in Quebec has been 
much more involved in providing fi nancial support for various social issues, eff orts to address homelessness in 
Montreal have been hampered by the fact that responsibility is fragmented among several organizations. 
Overall
As noted at the outset, contributions from multiple authors inevitably means that a variety of opinions—some 
contradictory—are presented. An introduction and two concluding chapters make a commendable eff ort to fi t 
the diverse material into an overall framework and to summarize the diverse fi ndings.
A number of unclear sentences suggest that more editing of the text would have helped. To illustrate:
•     Th e second focus of this book concerns the high turnover rate of incumbents, which is often said to account 
for the “political monopoly” observed at this level of government. (p. 10) Given the reference to a political 
monopoly and the fact that most of the book notes the staying power of incumbents, I assume that this 
sentence should have referred to the low turnover rate of incumbents?
•     A change in spending before elections was shown to positively correlate with the re-election of the incumbent 
municipal government. (p. 53) Th ere is no indication of whether we are referring to an increase or a decrease 
in spending.
•    A change in taxes before elections was negatively correlated with the re-election of incumbents…. (p. 53) 
Here again, there is no indication of whether taxes are going up or down—although the fact that re-election 
chances were harmed would presumably mean an increase in taxes. 
•    In Quebec municipalities political parties are virtually absent from the electoral process. (p. 55) Political 
parties at the local level are most prevalent in Quebec as discussed elsewhere in the book, which makes this 
statement puzzling.
•    Th e tax rate is measured as a municipality’s share of own-source revenues in the value of its total property 
value. (p. 61) I have no idea what this statement means. Municipalities have a variety of own-source 
revenues, varying by province—the most prominent of which is the property tax. Th e tax rate is essentially a 
mathematical ratio, a factor that will generate the amount of money needed by the municipality when levied 
against the total taxable assessment of a municipality.
•     It is important that we distinguish between majoritarian government parties where the mayor is the head of 
the party with a majority. (p. 91) Distinguish between those parties and what?
•     Elected at the ward level, they full endorse a vision of themselves as ward healer. (p. 170) No, the term is 
ward heeler and has traditionally referred to party workers who canvass for votes and perform other tasks in 
support of a party machine. Th ere is nothing healing about their activities, which have often been somewhat 
sordid.
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In addition, the book contains a number of examples of what a Queen’s Professor of mine from more than a half 
century ago would call “penetrating insights into the obvious.” For example: 
•     Th e probability of being re-elected is greatly reduced when the performance is considered weak and becomes 
practically zero when considered poor. (p. 52)
•     Incumbent mayors who reduce taxes in an election year are more likely to be re-elected than others. (p. 60)
•     A formal coalition presents more clarity than an informal one. (p. 92)
•     Average career lengths take a signifi cant plunge in the case of those just recently elected because we can’t 
see into the future. (p. 111, paraphrased)
•     When, as in Quebec, elections are held on a neighbourhood basis, elected offi  cials tend to represent one 
particular community. (p. 166)
•     Board members who are appointed by the province tend to align with the agenda pushed by the province. 
(p. 219)
•     Clarity of responsibility … is weakened when political power is more dispersed. (p. 259)
•     It is the tax rate that has a broad impact on municipal elections in Quebec. (p. 270)
•     Fragmentation between the diff erent levels of government is likely to raise barriers to implementing eff ective 
public policy. (p. 275)
Notwithstanding the shortcomings noted, this book is a welcome addition to the literature on local 
government, exploring concepts that are at the heart of municipal democracy, exhibiting an impressive amount 
of research, and pointing the way to areas in need of further study.
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